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RECENT CASES
to do so would result in an untenable situation and one that would
be contrary to the intention of Congress in waiving sovereign im-
munity. To allow the Government to determine the scope of the em-
ployment of its agents by written memoranda would cause many
actions under the Federal Tort Claims Act to depend upon the court's
interpretation of government correspondence. Such a result would be
opposed to the injured individual's right of recovery for harm done to
him through no fault of his own and thus opposed to the function of
tort law as it is recognized in its relationship to well established prin-
ciples of agency.
CHARTXs CAIX
CovE Nrs-WHEN A CHANGE OF CoNDnIoNs MAY RENDE A REsI-
DENTrAL REsnucroN UENFocEABLE-The plaintiffs, husband and
wife, purchased two lots in a subdivision, which were subject to cer-
tain restrictive covenants stating that they were to be used for
residential purposes only. The plaintiffs brought an action in equity
to have these residential restrictions adjudged unenforceable, alleging
that conditions in the neighborhood had changed so as to defeat the
purpose of the covenants. Commercial buildings had been built
across the street from the subdivision, and the plaintiffs' two lots had
been zoned "Commercial" by the City Zoning Commission. However,
the chancellor sustained a demurrer to the plaintiffs' petition, finding
that conditions had not changed within the subdivision itself so as to
defeat the purpose of the restriction, and that the action of the zoning
commission did not nullify the convenant. Held: Affumed. None of
the other lot owners within the Subdivision had waived or abandoned
the covenant, and while the action of the zoning commission indicated
a substantial change in the general area from residential to com-
mercial purposes, it did not have the force of destroying the restrictive
covenants. Changes must occur and be acquiesced in by the owners
of other lots within the subdivision, thus rendering the changes
permanent and materially defeating the purpose of the covenant,
before equity will declare the restriction unenforceable. Franklin v.
Moats 273 S.W. 2d 812 (Ky. 1954).
The situation presented in this case is one of ever-increasing im-
portance. The swift expansion of urban districts within the past fifty
years, especially the expansion of business and industry into suburban
areas, has created a conflict between the interests of homeowners in
preserving the residential character of the area and the interests of
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commerce and industry in acquiring new sites. Developers of sub-
divisions normally handle the problem temporarily by inserting in
their deeds residential restrictions limiting the character and usage
of structures to be erected. However, the property may soon become
more valuable for business purposes, and it is usually then that the
attempted breach of the covenant occurs.
In deciding whether or not to enjoin the violation of a restrictive
covenant, or to declare such covenants unenforceable, a court will
usually consider the equitable result in light of all the circumstances.
Injunctive relief will sometimes be denied where to grant it would
be inequitable, or where those seeking relief have estopped themselves
by their abandonment of the restriction or by their inaction.1 This is
the general rule applicable to the eliforcement of these restrictions.
In applying this general rule, however, the courts differ in their in-
terpretation of how extensive the changes in the neighborhood must
have been in order to render inequitable the enforcement of the
restriction. A majority of courts hold that changes outside the re-
stricted tract do not necessarily justify the denial of injunctive relief,
since such changes might reasonably have been within the contempla-
tion of the original parties to the restrictive covenants. 2 These changes
outside the area do not render -the restriction valueless, but, on the
contrary, protect the entire tract against destruction of the covenants
by successive enroachments. The theory which courts have adopted
in enforcing these restrictions is illustrated by the language used in
Swan v. Mitshkun:3
... those owning property in a restricted residential district or neigh-
borhood, and especially those who have their homes there and have
been led to buy or build in such locality by reason of restrictive
'Cherry v. Board of Home Missions, etc., 254 Mich. 496, 236 N.W. 841
(1931).
'Strong v. Hancock, 201 Cal. 530, 258 Pac. 60 (1927) (Changed conditions
in surrounding neighborhood, but outside the tract restricted to residential use,
did not make it inequitable to enforce the covenants); Wineman Realty Co. v.
Pelavin, 267 Mich. 594, 255 N.W. 393 (1934) (Injunction agaist violations of
restrictions was granted where owners in the subdivision had observed the re-
strictions, though there were business inroads around the area.); Moreton v. Louis
G. Palmer Co., 230 Mich. 409, 203 N.W. 116 (1925) (Increased traffic and other
changes outside the immediate neighborhood held insufficient to warrant denial of
injunction); Strauss v. Ginzberg, 218 Minn. 57, 15 N.W. 2d 130 (1944) (Insuf-
ficient change in the character of the neighborhood acquiesced in by other owners
in the addition); Brown v. Huber, 80 Ohio St. 183, 88 N.E. 322 (1909) (Changes
in the character of the locality were not within the particular neighborhood in
which the plaintiff's property was situated. Injunction granted.); Magnolia Petro-
leum Co. v. Drauver, 183 Okla. 579, 83 P. 2d 840 (1938) (Unless there is a re-
lease or violation of restrictions within the same block, an injunction will issue
against violation of such restrictions by a single lot owner.).
'207 Mich. 70, 173 N.W. 529, 530 (1919).
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covenants running with the land imposed upon the street, block, or
subdivision in which they have purchased, are entitled to protection
against prohibited invasion regardless of how close business may
crowd around them on unrestricted property, provided the original
plan for a residential district has not been departed from in the
restricted district, street, or block and the restrictive requirements
have been generally enforced, or accepted and complied with by
purchasers.
A minority of courts hold that changed conditions within the
neighborhood, though outside the restricted tract itself, are sufficient
grounds for refusal to enforce restrictive covenants. These courts
usually refuse injunctive relief, or declare the covenant unenforceable,
where the restricted lot in question has been rendered undesirable or
unsuitable for residential purposes, and where maintenance of the
infringing structure would not seriously injure the interest of the lot
owner in whose favor the restriction is sought to be enforced.4
Although there is a conflict of authority as to whether changes
must be within the restricted tract itself in order to preclude enforce-
ment of restrictive covenants, courts have generally held that a ordi-
nance which rezones certain areas for business or commercial pur-
poses does not supersede existing residential restrictions so as to
prevent their enforcement.5 A leading case on this point, Vorenberg
v. BunnellG involved a suit to enjoin a violation of equitable restric-
tions. The defendant sought to build a public garage in an area
developed for residential purposes, and, in defense to the plaintiffs'
suit, relied upon the fact that the lots had been zoned commercial by
a zoning ordinance. The court, in granting the injunction, stated:
The zoning law . . . can not constitutionally relieve land within the
district covered by it from lawful restrictions affecting its use for
business purposes. The question, whether equity will specifically
enforce such restrictions, is . . . a matter for the exercise of sound
equitable discretion in the light of all attendant circumstances. 7
'Downs v. Kroeger, 200 Cal. 793, 254 P. 1101 (1927) (Terms and restric-
tions of the covenant no longer applicable to the existing state of things); Winde-
mere-Grand Improvement & Protective Ass'n v. American State Bank of Highland
Park, 205 Mich. 539, 172 N.W. 29 (1919) (Growth of manufacturing in the
neighborhood and increased traffic on the street fronting the restricted area de-
feated the purpose of the residential restrictive covenants); Forstmann v. Joray
Holding Co. 244 N.Y. 22, 154 N.E. 652 (1926) (Action to remove a building
which violated restrictions. The court held that the restricted block had no special
advantages for residence purposes, which would offset the encroachment 6f busi-
ness, since surrounding area was commercial and the value of the property for
residence purposes was relatively small.).
'Gordon v. Caldwell, 235 Ii. App. 170 (1924); Magnolia Petroleum Co. v.
Drauver, 183 Okla. 579, 83 P. 2d 840 (1938); Spencer v. Maverick, 146 S.W. 2d
819 (Texas 1941); Faubian v. Busch, 240 S.W. 2d 361 (Texas 1951).
'257 Mass. 399, 153 N.E. 884 (1926).
7 Id. 153 N.E. at 887.
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The Kentucky Court of Appeals first adopted this view with regard
to zoning regulations in the case of Goodwin Bros. v. Combs Lumber
Co.8 There the court refused injunctive relief against the violation of
restrictive covenants because the restrictions had been disregarded by
owners within the area for a number of years. The court stated, by
way of dictum, that a regulation zoning the area for commercial pur-
poses, while indicating a change in the nature of the subdivision, did
not have the force of destroying the restrictive covenants.
The problem of changes in the neighborhood had been considered
previously by the Kentucky Court in the case of Mechling v. Dawson.9
It was held in this case that since the street on which the plaintiff
lived still retained its quiet residential character, and in view of the
fact that there had been no fundamental change over to business
within the restricted area itself, the covenant was properly enforced.
The covenant, which restricted the owners to residential construction,
had been technically violated by the erection of a church, but the
court said that this was not the same as establishing business within
the tract, and that this violation was too inconsequential to effect a
material change in the character of the neighborhood.' 0
A minority of courts, while declaring covenants unenforceable
because of a change of conditions in the neighborhood, also hold that
the covenants are still enforceable at law in an action for damages
resulting from a breach. 1 This result, of course, creates a cloud on
the title to the property. In a growing number of cases, however,
courts have held that if the restriction is terminated in equity, the
covenant creating it is also -terminated at law. The result is to remove
any cloud on the title which might render it unmarketable and to
bar any action at law seeking damages for breach of covenant.12
It is believed that the Kentucky court has adopted the better
view in holding that a change of conditions in the neighborhood, out-
side the restricted area, does not preclude the enforcement of restric-
tive covenants. Many persons purchase property in restricted areas
relying on the fact that their quiet and residential neighborhood will
not be invaded by the increased traffic and congestion that usually
8275 Ky. 114, 120 S.W. 2d 1024 (1938).
234 Ky. 318, 28 S.W. 2d 18 (1930). See also Greer v. Bornstein 246 Ky.
286, 54 S.W. 2d 927 (1932); There it was held that changes in the neighborhood
would notpreclude enforcement of a restrictive covenant when they occurred on
property adjacent to the development but not on any part of it.
See also Vorenburg v. Bunnell, supra note 6.
"Strong v. Shatto, 45 Cal. App. 29, 187 Pac. 159 (1917); II. American Law
of Property 398 (Sec. 9.22) (1952).
' MacArthur v. Hood Rubber Co., 221 Mass. 372, 109 N.E. 162 (1915); II.
American Law of Property, supra note 11.
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accompany a business district. Of course, allowing one business to
be established within a subdivision obviously would not affect the
whole area and would probably cause only slight inconvenience to
adjoining lot owners. But the successive encroachment of perhaps
three or four businesses, although in only one section of the sub-
division, might constitute a waiver which would allow the whole area
to be converted to commercial use; and as more businesses are
established, the realty would become more valuable as commercial
property, thus inducing lot owners to sell property for business rather
than residential use.1 3 It is sometimes necessary in cities that resi-
dential and business districts adjoin one another, but the right of
homeowners to injunctive relief against violations of restrictive cove-
nants should be upheld, until such owners themselves allow the cove-
nants to lapse by waiver or abandonment.
ROBERT A. PALZ'm
See the dissenting opinion in Downs v. Kroeger, supra note 4.
